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Abstract 
The increasing volume of research and writing on the management of change and the many prescriptions for change 
promulgated by various writers and practitioners is not matched by a corresponding increase in the effectiveness of change 
initiatives. High failure rates for new technology implementations and for other change initiatives, such as TQM, appear 
to point to the failure of previous research to identify the fundamental drivers of successful change management. A multi-
plant case study into the elements of successful change management examined four meat plants which were introducing new 
technology into the chain process. The study found that the most critical factor in the relative success of change was the 
quality of the employment relationship prior to the change. A 'positive' prior context characterised by such factors as high 
trust relationships, mutual respect and high delegation was more likely to lead to a successful outcome than a 'negative' 
prior context characterised by such factors as autocratic management, low trust and low mutual respect. These results 
affirm some earlier research carried out in the 1970's and 1980's on labour relations in the New Zealand meat industry. 
This research was carried out to examine the process of 
change management in the meat industry, focusing on the 
implementation of new technology on the sheep/lamb kill-
ing chains . The initial impetus came from a trades union 
research project on restructuring in the meat industry (The 
Meat Industry Study, 1988) which suggested that the cost of 
new chain technology was actually much higher than was 
thought because of, among other things, deficient imple-
mentation and human resource management processes. 
The management of change 
There has been a great deal of study on different aspects of 
change over the last twenty years and many models and 
prescriptions, some theoretical and some practitioner ori-
ented have been developed. The reason for this attention is 
that change in all aspects of our organisational environment 
has become a defining characteristic of the late twentieth 
century. Notwithstanding the amount of research and the 
number of highly paid change consultants, the management 
of change in many cases does not appear to be carried out 
very well. There has been much comment on the high failure 
rates of different kinds of change initiatives. For example 
the 1970s saw the rise ofTotal Quality Management (TQM), 
a significant driver of organisational change. The TQM 
failure rate in 1979 was estimated at 90% by one of the TQM 
movement's founders (Crosby, 1979). By 1991 the failure 
rate was estimated to be still as high as 80% (Fuchsberg, 
1992a, 1992b; Training and Development, 1992) and there 
is a growing feeling among managers that TQM is "too hard" 
(Economist, 1992). TQM is now acquiring the reputation of 
being just another management fad (Main, 1991 : Tetzeli, 
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1992). Replacing TQM in popularity is Business Process 
Reengineering (BPR). Although BPR is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, we already have reports of failure rates of over 
50% (Belmonte et al , 1993; Hall et al, 1993 ; Stewart, 1993). 
New Technology change initiatives also appear to suffer 
from high failure rates . In the UK these are estimated 
variously as between 40% - 70 % (Bessant and Haywood, 
1985; McKracken, 1986; New, 1989). Kearney (1989) 
estimated that in the UK one third of money invested in new 
technology (1.9 billion pounds) was wasted due to faulty 
implementation management. 
There has been little serious attempt by management theo-
rists to discover why there are such high failure rates for 
these change initiatives (Reger et al , 1994) but Revenaugh 
( 1994) sees fau lty implementation as a majorcauseoffailure 
while Schonberger ( 1994 ), in a survey of BPR and TQM 
implementations found that the reasons for failure varied 
from a lack of commitment by senior managers to inappro-
priate human resource practices. Some writers (Dale and 
Cooper, 1992; Crosby, 1979; Kearney, 1989)sawmanage-
ment lack of ability in managing change and in motivating 
and involving employees as major contributors to failure. 
These studies point to the sources of failure as lying in the 
lack of ability of managers to successfully deal with the 
affective characteristics in the sphere of the social sub-
systems of the organisations. 
In looking at the poor record of other kinds of organisational 
change implementations, some writers (e.g. Duck, 1993; 
Vrakking, 1995; Kanter et al, 1992) point to the inadequacy 
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of the many change recipes and models in their failure to 
recognise the essential 'messiness' of the change process. 
These writers point out that change is not an orderly, linear, 
stepwise process amenable to the kind of programmed 
solutions we find in many texts and used by many consult-
ants. These writers characterise the change process as a 
chaotic, iterative process, much of which stems from the 
less tangible aspects of the organisation, the informal 
systems, culture, history and so on. In particular, Kanter 
et al talk about the importance of the "building blocks of 
change" and the "prehistory of change" to the success of the 
change implementation. 
The findings of the research reviewed here support these 
ideas. All the plants in the study followed similar change 
'recipes', which were based on the New Technology Agree-
ments in their employment contracts. These prescriptions 
consisted of: 
a. Adequate prior notification of intended change 
b. Participation in design and configuration of the technol-
ogy 
c. Participation and negotiation in decisions about manning, 
redundancy, and rates of pay for working the new technol-
ogy. 
The concerns of the affected employees and their representa-
tives, the site delegates and regional union officials, centred 
on what would happen to displaced staff, the speed at which 
the chain would run, how many people would work the new 
system and how much pay the people operating the new 
system would receive. 
Each plant used a similar change recipe yet there were very 
different outcomes between the plants in terms of the success 
of the implementations. The most significant factor which 
explained this difference lay in the nature of the informal 
social processes of continuity which pertained at each plant 
and in which the change processes were embedded. This is 
what Kanter et al mean by the "prehistory of change". In this 
area there was a distinct variation between the plants . The 
most successful plant, Plant 1, had what I have termed a 
'Positive Context' while the less successful plants had more 
'Negative Contexts' (Table 1) 
Methodology 
I used a qualitative approach as I wanted to get inside the 
'black box' of change management and examine the on-
going human dynamics involved in change. There has been 
a strong call for qualitative approaches to the study of change 
management (e.g. Johnson, 1987; Pettigrew, 1985). These 
authors feel that to try to understand the management of 
change it is necessary to go beyond describing the content of 
change management to look at the process of changing and 
that this can only be achieved through the use of a qualitative 
approach where it is possible to gather the kind of rich and 
"thick" data needed. Miles and Huberman ( 1995, p 147) 
point out that qualitative research is useful when the re-
searcher wishes to move beyond establishing relationships 
to investigate causality. The authors assert that attempting 
to establish causality using quantitative research, especially 
in a complex, social setting, is problematic. 
Case study research design is recommended by Yin who 
asserts that'' .. the case study allows an investigation to retain 
the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real life events 
such as ... organisational and managerial processes" (Yin, 
1984; p 14). These strengths are carried further through the 
use of multiple case study designs which allow for theory 
building and the testing and development of hypotheses 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1995, p 26). 
Four export meat works were selected for study in two 
matched sets of large and small plants. This allowed the 
minimisation of the risk of causal relationships being con-
fused by intervening variables such as plant size. Each plant 
was visited three times for a week on each vis it, over a period 
of 18 months. This provided longitudinality and facil itated 
the testing of hypotheses through replication. 
Data collection 
Primary data was gathered through semi and unstructured 
interviews on both individual and group bases with staff at 
all levels of each plant. Other stakeholders such as national 
union officials, industry associations and senior manage-
ment staff at respective head offices to provide a broader 
context. Data was also gathered in an opportunistic manner 
as events unfolded in front of me. I spent some time in each 
plant observing on the chain floor, in smoko rooms and so 
on. Production data was made available as were relevant 
records of negotiations and communications between 
meatworkers and management in the past. 
Data analysis 
Data was analysed using content analysis. This was achieved 
through a combination of initial, "eye-balling" analysis and 
peer review, supported and validated thro ugh the use of 
NUDIST, a ·'software system for managing, organising and 
supporting research qualitative data anal ysis projects." 
(Richards et al, 1992, p 2). 
Table 1. Characteristics of prior negative and positive contexts impacting on change process 
Characteristics of Positive Context 
* Informal processes 
* Delegation - empowerment 
* High trust relations 
* Feelings of ownership (eg "one team") 
* Feeling of mutual respect 
* High integrity leadership 
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Characteristics of Negative Context 
* Formal processes 
* Low delegation 
* Low trust relations 
* 
* 
* 
Feelings of alienation (eg " us and them") 
Lack of mutual respect 
Autocratic rule 
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Measure of success 
I used the same measure of success as used by the plants - the 
time it took for the new technology to pay back the original 
investment in it (see Table 2). This is based on the formula 
used by MIRINZ (Meat Industry Research Institute of New 
Zealand) to calculate the cost effectiveness of the new 
technology. Management at each plant estimated a payback 
time of between 12 and 18 months. In the event, none of the 
plants achieved this but Plant 1 was clearly more successful 
than the other plants, with a payback time of two years. 
These measures are based solely on actual stock killed in 
each plant. Other cost factors such as increased carcase and 
skin damage in the trial period have not been included in 
these calculations as it proved difficult to obtain reliable data 
from all the plants. The data I was able to obtain indicates 
that the differences between the plants would have been even 
greater, but the ranking would have been the same. 
The meat industry - a culture of conflict 
The meat industry has been of enormous importance to the 
economy of New Zealand over the last 100 years. There is a 
common perception that meat workers were highly paid, 
militant employees, ready to hold the country to ransom at 
the drop of a hat through strike action. The nature of the work 
is dirty, unpleasant, monotonous and dangerous . Tradition-
ally it was the butchers, the "aristocracy" of the plant 
employees, who are tough, uncompromising, skilled men 
working hard and prepared to confront management to 
achieve high wages, who were seen as the drivers and focus 
of conflict. Management, many of whom had risen throuah C> 
the ranks of the butchers, were themselves tough and uncom-
promising. technically skilled but with little management 
knowledge or training (lnkson. 1979). Many plants, devel-
oped in the days of a regulated, cost plus economy, were 
large and concerned primarily with killing and dressing as 
many sheep as possible. The meat industry was character-
ised by confrontational tactics on both sides but manaoe-e 
ment tended to accede to confrontational tactics and pass on 
the costs to the New Zealand tax-payer. 
The sequential nature of the process, perishability of the 
product during the process and the high strategic importance 
ofth~ product provided labour with an opportunity to apply 
maxtmum leverage in order to gain better wages and condi-
tions. Unions were well organised and were willing to take 
frequent and prolonged strike action to gain higher wages. 
Many plants had full time union officials, paid by the plants, 
as well as departmental delegates. Conflict levels in the meat 
industry were among the highest in New Zealand, with 
61.5% of working days lost in the manufacturing sector in 
the period 1981 - 85.2 Inkson reported that the meat industry 
"employs only three percent of the workforce but accounts 
for fifty percent of time lost through stoppages" (lnkson, 
1979). As New Zealand's single most important export 
earner, the meat industry, with its high levels of conflict, 
came under surprisingly little scrutiny from social science 
researchers during the period 1950 - 1970. 
However in 1976 Turkington offered a major review of the 
determinants of conflict in a study of the propensity to strike 
in three of New Zealand's most strike prone industries, one 
of which was the meat industry. 
Using 23 variables, he arrived at the conclusion that objec-
tive factors such as size, location and ownership, were the 
chief determinants of conflict levels in the meat industry, 
while factors such as management and supervision were 
accorded low significance. Turkington concluded that large 
plants with overseas owners in an urban setting were more 
prone to confl ict than others. In particular, Turkington 
found a positi ve correlation between size and number of 
stoppages- size explaining 51% of the variation in frequency 
of stoppages among the works. 
The size factor in organisations has been "By far ... the most 
widely researched anatomical factor" but Porter et al ( 1975, 
p 248) warned that size is not as simple a variable as it may 
appear to be. Different studies have produced widely 
varying reports on the correlation between size and various 
organisational attributes for example the results reported by 
Woodward (1958, 1965) and Harvey (1968). A major 
problem with meta-analysis of studies on the effects of 
organisation size is that many of them use different catego-
risations of size. For example, some may be working with 
sub-units of larger organisations while others are working 
with a whole organisation. 3 However, notwithstanding the 
problems and the contradictions between some of the stud-
ies, the weight of opinion from meta-analysis (eg Porter et 
al. 1975) agrees that organisational size appears to have a 
positive relationship with absenteeism, turnover and labour 
disputes and a negative relationship with job satisfaction. 
Turkington' s findings appeared to support these conclu-
sions but his study indicated that there were other possible 
variables contributing to the incidence of conflict. For 
example Turkington cites factors such as personality differ-
ences, poorly trained supervisors and communication prob-
lems. 
Table 2. Key plant statistics showing size, age, capacity and payback times for new technology 
Plant 
1 
2 
3 
4 
* At height of season 
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However, these issues are not examined by Turkington 
except as further outcomes of the size factor. His study was 
across the whole industry, using aggregate figures and while 
the study did much to stimulate further research, its major 
failing was that Turkington has little to say in explanation of 
the marked, within size category, inter-plant variation in 
conflict levels revealed, except to surmise that the variation 
must be caused by some interaction of the other factors. 
lnkson (1979) attempted to address this issue when he 
examined the incidence of conflict in the industry and found 
that it is "characterised by massive differences in intensity 
between the plants" eg differences in the number of man 
days lost per year varies from 0 .11 at one plant to 10.68 at 
another in the period 1967 - 73. Five out of 42 plants 
accounted for over 55% of the total lost time in the industry ." 
Other negative indicators such as accident statistics and 
abuse of ACC show similar variance (see also Turkington. 
44- 46.) Therefore the view found to be widely held in the 
industry and reinforced by Turkington' s study, that conflict 
is endemic and unavoidable right across the industry, does 
not appear to be valid. 
Other studies focused on the subjective, socio/technical 
factors which predisposed the industry to conflict eg Inkson 
& Cammock, (1988); Inkson, (1979), Geare, (1972) and 
which arrived at more powerful, alternative explanations for 
the inter-plant variance. Rather these studies pointed to the 
factor of management style and ability as determinants of 
conflict levels. 
Management style 
Turkington 's finding that the chief determinants of conflict 
are objective factors, beyond the control of managers or 
employees and other views that the nature of work itself 
causes stress and conflict, reinforce the kind of fatalistic 
attitudes towards the incidence of strikes and other manifes-
tations of disharmony and low job satisfaction often ex-
pressed by managers. Inkson found that managers saw the 
industrial relations problems they faced as largely beyond 
their control and attributed them for instance to "pure bloody 
mindedness by the men". "The descent from this kind of 
baffled abrogation of responsibility, into managerial pessi-
mism, fatalism and helpless inaction, is observable in some 
parts of the industry" (Inkson, 1979). 
Inkson goes on, " As long as the freezing industry has 
continued to operate profitably, its traditional, insular man-
agers and directors have seen no need for change. Little 
creative effort had yet been devoted to the long term solution 
of problems." (Inkson, 1979). In the regulated, cost plus 
world where the meat industry grew fat, there was little need 
to improve management skills or to address the long term 
problems. The high cost of this strategy was simply passed 
on to the tax payers of New Zealand. High levels of conflict 
were blamed on the meat workers and their intransigent 
unions or the large size of many plants and few plants looked 
at improving management skills as a means of addressing 
problems of conflict. 
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This perception on the part of many managers that they are 
helpless in the face of powerful and intransigent unions has 
shaped the nature of their response strategies both at an 
individual plant and company level and at the industry level 
through the Meat Industry Association (MIA). The Labour 
Relations Act (1987) and to an even greater extent, the 
Employment Contracts Act ( 1991 ), provided managers 
with the opportunity to weaken the perceived power of the 
unions. Thus, the problem of conflict in the industry was 
characterised as one of loss of control in the face of intran-
sigent conditions and forces and not one of poor manage-
ment training and skills. The answer was to attempt to regain 
control through " breaking" the unions ' perceived strength 
using the new powers under the changed legislation, as well 
as the constant threat of closure. 
Further evidence for the effects that management style and 
behaviour could have on conflict levels was provided by 
some single and multiple case studies of New Zealand 
freezing works. These studies examined management style, 
worker attitudes, job satisfaction and levels of conflict and 
indicated that management style has a great deal to do with 
levels of industrial harmony. 
lnkson & Simpson ( 1975) put forward a strong argument for 
management's quality and style as constituting a very s ig-
nificant factor in determining the levels of conflict at any one 
plant when they analysed the industrial relations record at 
two comparable plants. Inkson later compared these find-
ings with those from a third plant which reinforced the 
conclusions already arrived at (lnkson. 1979). One of these 
plants had been the subject of separate intensive analysis fo r 
a number of years by different researchers . This plant had 
been characterised by one of the worst industrial relations 
records in the country when a new manager was brought in 
with a new approach and a mandate to use it. He imple-
mented participative practices and training for supervisors 
and managers in facil itation skills. The results were re-
ported to be little short of astounding. The levels of conflict 
dropped considerably . In addition butchers became less 
instrumental- the importance of cash being lower and that of 
relationships with peers and supervisors higher and they had 
higher job satisfaction, now finding the job less boring. 
Researchers concluded that there was a direct causal rela-
tionship between the more considerate management style 
and the more positive outcomes. (Howells & Alexander, 
1968; Ryman, 1979; Paske, 1979). These studies indicated 
that "good" management could lead to lower conflict. How-
ever, lnkson ( 1979) reminds us that managerial influence 
may have the opposite effect. Two case studies revealed that 
management often make a significant contribution to raising 
the level of conflict through their actions, even if it may be 
at times unwitting (Geare, 1972; Howells & Alexander, 
1968). 
In conclusion, the above studies indicate that a main cause 
of the considerable inter-plant variation in conflict levels 
that Turkington failed to explain may well be the quality of 
the management and supervision and that management may 
make a significant contribution to levels of conflict in any 
one plant. The findings of my research fit well with these 
conclusions. 
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The plants in the study 
Plants 1 and 3 were single chain plants with similar back-
grounds. They had both been local abattoirs which had come 
to export s laughtering relatively recently. Both plants had 
gone through recent ownership changes and faced consider-
able financial problems as the meat industry restructured . 
Plants 2 and 4 were much larger multi-chain plants which 
had been operating in export slaughtering from their incep-
tion . While the payback times initially appear to support the 
notion that size determined the outcome in that the two 
smaller plants had lower payback times than the two larger 
plants, there were clear differences between the two plants 
in each size category. Plant 1 was clearly the most successful 
in managing the change from the old system to the new, 
taking only 2 years to pay back the investment (Table 2) 
while the other small plant, Plant 3, took 3 years. Of the two 
larger plants, Plant 2 took 4.5 years to pay back the 
investment while Plant 4 took 3.75 years. So the question 
was - how to explain the within-size-category variation in 
the success of the change management process? 
As mentioned previously , all the plants followed very 
similar change management pathways involving the now 
traditional prior warning, negotiation over manning and pay 
and output levels . The answer to the above question- how 
to explain the differences between the plants appeared to lie 
in the social contexts in which the changes were embedded. 
The qualitative data gathered at the plants pointed to very 
different social dynamics in the plants. In particular, Plant 
l with the best performance, was characterised by high trust, 
high delegation of authority and responsibility, low levels of 
conflict, informal processes, especially problem solving 
and dispute resolution and high levels of a feeling of owner-
ship in all staff. At Plant 1 they regarded the plant as 'ours". 
The relationship between the GM and the Production Man-
ager and supervisors was characterised by mutual respect 
and trust. All staff, including engineers and MAF inspectors 
worked together to solve problems and keep the chain 
operating. The GM was widely perceived to be working for 
the plant and its employees, fighting to get the resources 
they needed to make the plant work, often at the risk of his 
own position. The Production Manager was an ex-butcher 
and would often appear on the chain floor to see how 
operations were going. He had even been known to don the 
hygiene gear and join the chain, knife in hand, in response 
to a challenge from the butchers. In contrast, Plant 3. the 
other small plant with a similar profile to Plant l , had a GM 
perceived to be remote and to be "working for Head Office". 
He was rarel y seen on the chain floor and then it would be a 
fleeting visit where he would talk briefly to the MSH 
supervisor and disappear. The Production Manager would 
likewise be seen rarely by the butchers and he preferred to 
stay out of the MSH, leaving control to the Supervisor. This 
man exercised an iron control, tolerating no horseplay, 
singing or shouting. He expressed contempt for the quality 
of the people under his command and felt that he had to 
motivate them by fear. The butchers had to ask permission 
to go to the lavatory by holding up their hands and they 
complained that they were treated like children. An oppor-
tunity to witness the results of thi s kind of regime came when 
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the frequent breakdowns during the trial period happened. 
At Plant 3, as soon as this happened, the men would rush 
outside and start playing cricket or just taking it easy while 
the supervisor and the engineers tried to rectify the problem. 
When asked why they didn't stay and help sort the problem 
out, they simply replied "Why should we? They do nothing 
for us, we're treated like shit, so why should we help them 
make money?" In contrast, at Plant 1, I saw instances where 
a breakdown would occur and immediately the butchers 
involved, with the supervisor, MAF inspectors and engi-
neers would work together to resolve the problem very 
quickly. The butchers would also notice when their machin-
ery was starting to malfunction and would proactively at-
tempt to fix it themselves to prevent an actual breakdown. At 
Plant 3, a particular piece of semi-automated machinery 
suffered from continual breakdowns until eventually this 
machine was pulled off the chain completely and was never 
made to work. The same problem at Plant 1 occurred and 
was resolved very quickly in the manner described above 
and continued to work well. 
There is not the space here to give all the many examples and 
comparisons between the plants that I witnessed and re-
corded. However, Plants 2 and 4 compared in a similar 
manner but to a different degree. Although Plant 4 was the 
largest plant, it performed better than Plant 2 the second 
largest plant. Plant 4 , while not having the highly positive 
social context of Plant l, there were certainly less manifes-
tations and expressions of negative attributes than at Plant 2. 
As with first comparison between Plants 1 and 3, social 
dynamics at Plant 2 were characterised by low trust rela-
tions, low delegation, autocratic leadership style and an 
attitude of contempt for the butchers working on the chains. 
The GM was remote and perceived not to understand the lot 
of the people working on the chains. The Production 
Manager had been a butcher himself but was perceived to 
use this understanding to better control the butchers. His 
control was absolute and initiatives and useful ideas from the 
butchers were ignored at best and in one case a group were 
punished for developing a better way of carrying out their 
work which involved rotating round the duties in a particular 
configuration. The work was arduous and they found that 
their design enabled them to keep up a high pace with far less 
strain. They had started to carry out their work using their 
design when their foreperson noticed it. He informed the 
Senior Supervisor who then came along and told them they 
couldn 't do it. They refused to stop and the Production 
Manager was brought in . He ordered them to stop and would 
listen to no explanations on the matter. When the butchers 
continued to work using their method they were sacked . The 
Labour Court reinstated them on the grounds of unjustifiable 
dismissal but this incident did little to build positive rela-
tions. Plant 4 was also characterised by high levels of 
distrust between engineering and production staff at all 
levels. Senior staff would not eat in the same room, even 
though there was a room specifically set aside for this 
purpose. The Chief Engineer regarded himself as answer-
able only to Head Office and would not communicate in any 
meaningful way with the GM. Maintenance engineers 
called in to fix malfunctioning equipment on the chain not 
only would receive no help from the butchers but would be 
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actively hindered. I saw an incident where the engineer's 
tool box was removed and hidden as he knelt on the floor to 
examine the equipment. He turned to reach for a spanner 
only to find no tool box and a group of butchers studiously 
looking at the roof. 
I have cited these incidents as illustrations of the differing 
social contexts within the plants. There are many such 
incidents and stories but here is not the place to enlarge on 
them. 
Implications for labour relations 
The implications for labour relations are clear. Although 
objective factors such as size may have a significant effect 
on the quality of the social context and hence on the quality 
of the performance of the plant, it is evident that effective, 
positive leadership may create a social context characterised 
by mutual trust and respect. Problems, whether they be of 
the usual labour relations sort such as wage negotiations, or 
of introducing change, are more likely to be resolved 
quickly and effectively in such a context. These interper-
sonal factors appear to be of more importance than negoti-
ated frameworks such as new technology agreements, which 
may be observed in the letter of the agreement but in practice 
may be rendered less than effective through the enacted 
social dynamics. Positive social contexts may be said to be 
both the glue that holds the organisation together and the 
lubricant which enables it to run smoothly to the benefit of 
all the people in it. 
Conclusion 
This study began by trying to determine which "recipe" for 
change was more effective by examining the methods used 
to manage change at each plant. The data showed that all the 
plants in the study used very similar recipes yet there were 
very different outcomes in terms of the success of the change 
initiative. The analysis indicated that the reasons for these 
differential outcomes lay primarily in the area of the social 
context and dynamics at each plant. Rather than the mecha-
nism that was used to implement change affecting the 
outcomes, it was the prior, social context in which the 
changes were embedded which were major determinants of 
success. A chief component of the prior context was the 
quality and style of the leader and management in general 
and their effect on engendering either a positive or negative 
context and hence higher or lower levels of trust, openness, 
participation and co-operation. The analysis supports the 
notion of a more chaotic model of the change process rather 
than a simplistic, step by step model. The major implication 
for change management theory and practice is that the 
success of change management is dependent on the manage-
ment of the continuity in which the change is embedded. 
These findings fit well with previous studies carried out in 
the New Zealand meat industry which indicated that the 
large differences in conflict levels between similar plants 
could be attributed to the quality of management, rather than 
to the militancy of the unions. The research suggests that 
even the most apparently intractable labour relations situa-
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tion may be at least ameliorated by positive, integrity based 
management approaches. 
Future research 
Further research into change initiatives in New Zealand in 
particular and into labour/management relations in general 
to determine the causes of success and failure is needed to 
explore these ideas further. This methodology could be 
extended to examine change initiatives in New Zealand such 
as TQM, which are reported to experience high levels of 
failure, to better understand what factors determine relative 
success or failure. How exactly do the factors such as 
empowerment, trust and so on, work together and are there 
change management situations where the nature and quality 
of these factors have little impact on change management 
performance outcomes as may be implied by the contin-
gency model of Dunphy and Stace (1988)? 
The research was carried out during the overlap between the 
Labour Relations Act, 1987 and the incoming Employment 
Contracts Act, 1991. It would be interesting to find out if the 
herein proposed relationship between quality of manage-
ment and the nature of the social context is still apparent of 
has been modified in any way. We could speculate that it is 
likely that any such relationship would be largely independ-
ent of the prevailing legal frameworks and that therefore 
there has been no change. 
Lastly, an ancillary but important issue arising from this 
study is that of the true cost of new technology. There 
appears to be a significant difference between the costs 
estimated by managers and the actual costs of the new 
technology in the four meat plants . Is this a more general 
phenomenon and do we need to construct better costing 
models? 
Notes 
1. I would like to acknowledge the guidance and help of 
Dr Roberta Hill of Webb Research and Dr V Nilakant, 
Dept of Management, Canterbury University in the 
research project and to the Alma Baker Trust for provid-
ing a grant to carry out the research . I must also thank 
the staff at all levels in the meat plants who generously 
and patiently allowed me to see into their world . How-
ever any mistakes are my own. 
2. Dept of Statistics, Summary of Statistics, 1986. 
3. For a fuller treatment of the problems of research using 
the size variable see Damanpour, 1992. 
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